Based on the frictional matching framework, the paper provides a theoretical model for the two-sided platform in which the number of participants and the source of network externalities are endogenously determined. The platform is shown to exhibit both positive crossgroup and negative within-group network externalities. The optimal pricing of the platform depends not only on the cost of providing service and the benefits of the participants, but also on how a new entrant (either a buyer or a seller) affects the matching probability.
tive approximation. But unlike the network products from which the users directly gain utility from the number of adopters (e.g., Arthur 1989), network externalities in the platforms are usually indirect. The impact of the number of participants on individual agents should be derived, rather than assumed. Moreover, in order to evaluate the relative response of participants on different sides of the platform to the platform's pricing, it is necessary to have a microfoundation for exactly how externalities are determined. Second, although a participant enjoys more positive externality as the number of participants on the other side of the platform increases, he also suffers a negative externality from participants on the same side. has not been formally investigated. 4 This is also an important consideration in the platform's pricing policy, as its incentives to subsidize the participants in order to facilitate positive externalities, a fact much emphasized in the literature, will be checked by the existence of negative externalities. An explicit modeling of interaction within the platform can help investigating the effect of negative externalities. Third, although in some cases it is not necessary to distinguish between the roles of the buyers and the sellers in the platform (e.g., dating or social network platforms), in other cases this distinction is important. 5 Many models in the literature, though labelling some participants as the buyer and the others the seller, do not really distinguish between the two types of participants. 6 Consequently, the roles of buyer and seller are only nominal: Sellers are actually not selling anything to the buyers, and the results in these papers stay the same when the labels of buyers and sellers are switched. However, to distinguish between the roles of the buyers and sellers is important because the sellers in the platform generally also charge the buyers for the service or commodity they provide. In that case the sellers have the ability to shift some of the fees which the platform charges them to the buyers. This implies that the sellers' entry decision is less elastic to entry fees than the buyers. As we will see in Section 3, this has strong a implication on the platform's pricing policy.
In this paper we provide a model which explicitly specifies the interaction between the buyers and sellers. We impose on the traditional model of platforms a frictional matching framework (Burdett et al. 2001 ) for pricedetermination. In the framework, a group of sellers (each having one unit of a good) meet a group of buyers (each needing one unit of the good) in a platform. The sellers post prices, and the buyers choose the sellers to buy from. A seller's good is sold (at the price he posts) if and only if at least one buyer visits his store. A buyer, if he is the only visitor of a seller, buys the 5 For example, in the platforms of payment card, the online auction, the video game console, or the shopping mall, the buyers and sellers play completely different roles. good with probability one. Otherwise he has an equal chance of buying the good as every other visitor. The platform charges both buyers and sellers for using the platform. Prices set by the platform determine how many buyers and sellers will enter.
We solve for the equilibrium prices of both the platform and the sellers, together with the equilibrium numbers of the sellers and buyers and their utilities. A buyer's utility is shown to be increasing (decreasing) in the number of sellers (buyers). Similarly, a seller's utility is increasing (decreasing) in the number of the buyers (sellers). Moreover, a buyer's or a seller's utility is bounded, regardless of the number of agents on the other side of the platform.
The platform's pricing decision is more complicated than in the previous literature. In addition to factors such as service costs and positive externalities considered in the previous literature, it also has to take into consideration its effect on the matching probability and the influence of negative externalities.
We therefore provide a model in which externalities, prices, and the number of traders are all endogenously determined. In particular, the presence of negative externalities and the ability of the sellers to pass through their entry fees to consumers are not merely to add a reasonable feature to the platform. It has a strong implication for the platform's pricing policy: unlike the past literature, the platform never subsidizes the sellers by charging a fee lower than its marginal cost.
Our model is closest to that of Galeotti and Moraga-Gonzalez (2009).
Similar to our paper, they also explicitly model the interaction of the buyers and sellers within a platform. In their model, the matching values between the buyers and sellers are (ex post) random, so that it is essentially a product differentiation model. There are two additional features in the paper which are different from our model. First, in their model there is a continuum of buyers whose total mass is restricted to one. Second, the buyers and sellers are ex ante identical, implying that the pricing policy of the platform is either for all the buyers and sellers to enter, or none at all. Given the two features, their paper's main focus is not on how externalities are affected by the numbers of buyers or sellers and, therefore, to show how the platform set fees to balance the tradeoff between entry fees and network externalities, but on the interplay between product variety (in term of the number of sellers) and the buyer's entry fee.
Hagiu (2009) also proposes a model with product differention. The consumer's utility is assumed to be increasing in product variety, which in turn is assumed to be the same as the number of producers. Given the assumptions, the number of producers has a positive network externality for the consumers. The paper has not derived the pricing decision of the producer, but it is shown that whether the platform will subsidize the producers or the consumers critically depends on the producer's market power over the consumers, as measured by the ratio of producer's profit to the marginal contribution of an additional producer to consumer's gross surplus.
In our model, the seller's products are identical to the buyers, ex ante or ex post. Therefore, the source of externalities is not product variety, as seller posts a price for the good, which every buyer observes. Based on the observation, every buyer determines the probability that he will visit each seller. A buyer can only buy from the seller he visits. As a result, a seller's commodity might remain unsold if no buyer arrives. This is true even if he is among the lowest-price sellers. If more than one buyer arrives, the good is sold to each visitor with equal probability. This also implies that a buyer might fail to buy the good even if his willingness to pay is greater than the 7 Since in our model the buyers and the sellers transact at most once, the entry fee (properly discounted by matching probability) and transaction fee (commission charged by the platform every time an agent makes transaction) are perfect substitutes.
price posted by the seller he visits, as that seller might have more than one visitor.
Under the setup, the role that a platform plays is, on the one hand, to provide price information to the buyers and, on the other hand, to match the buyers and sellers. As mentioned above, a seller might fail to sell his good if no buyer visits him, and a buyer might not be able to buy a good if there are other buyers who visit the same seller. Therefore, this is a price matching model with friction.
The buyers are homogeneous regarding the valuation of the good, but are heterogeneous in the cost of entering and using the platform. 
, if he visits a seller and buys the good at price p;
if he visits a seller but fails to buy the good; 0, if he does not join the platform.
Similarly, a seller's utility function is Let the platform's cost of serving a buyer and a seller be c b and c s , respectively. 8 We assume that the costs are not very high so that at least two buyers and two sellers enter the platform. 9 The platform's objective is to set the entry fees to maximize its profit:
Timing of events is as follow. 
Frictional Matching Stage
In the frictional matching model in Burdett et al. (2001) , there is a unique symmetric equilibrium such that every buyer visits each seller with the same 8 Note that the platform incurs cost c b (c s ) even if a buyer (seller) fails to trade. 9 The sufficient condition for this is c b ≤
probability, and all sellers post the same price. In our model, there is also a symmetric equilibrium: 
(1)
The expected number of matches is
The proof is a simple adaptation of Burdett et al. (2001) .
10
We can rewrite the equilibrium price in (1) as
where
For a successful match, the total surplus is v b − v s ≡ v. Moreover, the benefit for the buyer is v b − p * = (1 − z)v, and that for the seller is p
Therefore, the value of z determines the share that the seller gets from the surplus of the transaction. Since z is a function of only N s and N b , the buyer's and seller's share of the surplus from transaction is solely determined by their numbers in the platform. 10 We provide a proof in A1 of the Appendix for the sake of completeness.
The sellers and the buyers are "complements" in the expected number of matches, M (·), in the sense that
relative to the number of agents on one side of the platform is a measure of how likely a trader on that side can have a match. The lower its value, the less likely a trader on that side will be successfully matched. Specifically, we measure the degree of friction on side i by
is also called the arrival rate, and can be shown to be increasing in N j and decreasing in N i ; i, j ∈ {b, s}, i = j. 12 That is, the arrival rate is increasing in the number of traders on the other side, and decreasing in the number of traders on the same side.
The expected utility functions of a buyer and a seller on the platform can be rewritten as
where u b and u s are willingness-to-pay of the buyer and seller to enter the platform, respectively. We can then investigate how the number of traders affects the equilibrium price and the traders' utilities: 
11 See A2 in the Appendix. 12 See A2 in the Appendix. 13 The proofs of all the propositions are in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 shows that in a model in which the matching process and price formation are explicitly spelled out, the platform exhibits not only the well-known positive network externalities in the literature, but also negative externalities as well.
The exogenous specification of linear positive network externalities in the literature implies that the seller's (buyer's) utility is infinite when the number of buyers (sellers) grows without bound. In our matching framework, since the maximum utility a trader gains cannot surpass the surplus of transaction, v, the utility of any trader is necessarily bounded regardless of the number of traders on any side. This is shown in the following corollary. Another important feature of our matching framework is that although positive externalities encourages more agents to enter the platform when there are more agents on the other side, the presence of negative externalities also discourages their entrance. The optimal pricing decision of the platform is therefore more complicated than one with only positive externalities. This issue is discussed in the next section.
Given the equilibrium outcome for the frictional matching stage discussed in the previous section, in this section we will derive the optimal pricing strategy of the platform, together with the equilibrium number of buyers and sellers (N b and N s ) implied by the optimal strategy.
Since a trader receives zero utility if he does not enter the platform, his expected utility must be at least 0 for him to join the platform willingly.
We focus on the interior solution case in which there exists anx
14 Buyers with expected utilities greater than or equal to 0 (that is, buyers with x b ≤x b ) will join the platform. Since x b is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], the number of buyers entering the platform, given F b , is
The same reasoning applies to the seller's side, so that
Simultaneously solving for (6), (7), we can write the numbers of buyers and sellers in the platform as the functions of entry fees,
. 15 The platform's profit can then be written as
14 The conditions for having an interior solution on each side are: 15 Note that N b and N s as calculated in (6) and (7) are not necessarily integers. However, the model in Section 2 requires that they be integers. We can take the values of
In the following proposition we characterize the equilibrium fees and the equilibrium number of buyers and sellers in the platform.
Proposition 3. The profit-maximizing entry fees satisfy
The equilibrium numbers of participants of buyers and sellers satisfy
It might be helpful to compare the optimal pricing strategy in our model with that in Armstrong (2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2006) . 16 In their papers, the equilibrium entry fees are
where a b > 0 and a s > 0 are the parameters of cross-group positive externalities to buyers and sellers. 17 The effects of the cross-group externalities, −a s N s and −a b N b , help to reduce the the equilibrium fees.
N b and N s in Section 2 to be the nearest integers to those defined by (6) and (7) respectively. When N is large, as a meaningful model of two-sided platform should exhibit, this approximation does not the results in the paper. 16 Rochet and Tirole (2006) consider the case in which the platform charges not only entry fees but also transaction fees. In order to compare with our model (in which there is only an entry fee), we set the transaction fee to be zero in their model. 17 In their models, the potential number of users, N , is normalized to 1.
We capture the same effects by the terms −u Note that since a b is exogenously given and there is no negative externality, if the value of a b is large, the platform will have an incentive to attract a large number of sellers by subsidizing them, and thereby creates enormous network benefit. In that case the platform can charge a very high fee for the buyers. However, this cannot happen in our model. In fact, we will show that the platform never subsidizes the sellers.
Corollary 2. The total marginal network effect of the seller is negative, i.e.,
Proof. 
Corollary 2 and (9) then imply that F s > c s , i.e., the platform never subsidizes the sellers. However, there are still cases in which the platform charges the buyers a fee lower than the marginal cost. 19 This result is consistent with many pricing strategies in reality, where the buyers (consumers)
are usually subsidized while the sellers usually are not. 20 The reason for this result is quite intuitive: since the price of the commodity is set by the sellers, they can shift some of the burden of the entry fee to the buyers. The buyers, on the other hand, can only refrain from joining the platform (in which case the platform loses the revenues from their fees) if they think the fee is too high. In other words, the price elasticity (for entry fee) of the sellers is lower than that of the buyers. Therefore, the platform's cost of raising fees is greater on the buyer's side than on the seller's side. 
As can be seen from (12) and (13), the equilibrium entry fees can be separated into two parts. The first part is the traditional markup pricing formula of the monopolist (without externalities), 1 2 (u i +c i ). The second part is the total marginal network effects caused by the agent,
By our previous discussion, this term is positive for i = s, but can be either positive or negative for i = b. Therefore, the optimal fee for the sellers is higher than the monopolistic price, but can be either higher or lower for the buyers.
Using (6) and (7), we can also rewrite the platform's profit function as
The buyers and the sellers can be therefore viewed as two inputs to produce successful matchings as output, with vM (N b , N s ) as the production function,
2 the cost function. Then equations (10) and (11) simply say that the platform's optimal strategy is to "hire" each input until its marginal product, vM i , equals its marginal cost, c i + 2
A change in fee to one side of the platform affects both the number of agents on this side and (therefore) the externalities enjoyed by agents on the other 21 By substituting (8) and (9).
side. Since the price elasticity for side i is larger when
and the positive network effect which side i brings to side j is larger when u j i N j is larger, the optimal fee F i is lower when
Some Comparative Static Results
In this section we will perform several comparative statics exercises regarding changes in costs and trading surplus. For each result we only discuss the intuition behind it, and leave its proof to the appendix. When the surplus from trade, v, increases exogenously, it makes a successful matching more valuable. The platform's best response is to induce more agents to join the platform, so that the marginal contributions of all agents become smaller, in order to recover (10) and (11) . Therefore, an in-creasing in trade surplus leads to the intuitive result that the numbers of both sellers and buyers increase.
The change in the platform's pricing policy in response to parametric change is harder to pin down. However, when the number of users in the platforms is large, as we expect to see in the real world, there will be definite answers, as the following lemma shows. 
Conclusion
In this paper we provide a theoretical model of the two-sided platform in which the number of buyers and sellers, the seller's prices, and, more importantly, the sources of network externalities are endogenously determined.
The platform is shown to exhibit both positive and negative network externalities: A participant's benefit in joining the platform is increasing in the number of participants on the other side of the platform, and decreasing in the number of participants on the same side. Moreover, unlike the case of linear externalities, the benefit of a participant is bounded, even if the number of participants on the other side of the platform goes to infinity. The optimal pricing policy of the platform is shown to depend not only on the costs of providing service and benefit to the participants but, more importantly, also on how a new entrant (either a buyer or a seller) affects the matching prob-we also derive certain theoretical predictions which differ from past literature. For example, we show that the platform never subsidizes the sellers by charging a fee lower than its marginal cost, but might subsidize the buyers.
This result is consistent with the platform pricing policy generally observed in practice.
This paper considers only the monopoly platforms. For future research, it will be interesting to also study the oligopoly case. In particular, since our model provides a microfoundation for the platform, issues that are difficult to tackle in the previous theoretical models such as single-vs. multi-homing choice might be more easily analyzed in the present framework.
A1. The Proof of Proposition 1
Follow Burdett et al. (2001), let φ(a) be the probability that at least one buyer visits a particular seller when all buyers visit this seller with probability
be the probability that a given buyer gets served when he visits this seller.
Hence,
If every seller posts a price p and one contemplates deviating to p d , the buyer visits the deviant with probability a d . The probability that he visits each of the nondeviants is
, given there are N s sellers in the platform. As a result,
and a buyer who visits a nondeviant gets served with probability
) .
In the equilibrium,
This condition can be written as
Because the expected profit of the deviant is (
first-order condition of the deviant's utility maximize problem is
If we focus on the interior solution such that a d ∈ (0, 1), we can differentiate (15) and then insert the symmetric equilibrium conditions
Inserting this into the first-order condition, we arrive at
A2. Properties of the Matching Function and the Arrival Rates
We will show that the arrival rate of one side of the platform is increasing (decreasing) in the number of agents on the other (same) side of the platform.
To complete the proof, it is necessary to check the properties of the matching
. We can first show that
We can also show that M is concave in both N b and N s :
Also,
Finally,
A3. The Proof of Proposition 2
First note that
To prove this proposition, it suffices to show that (i) the sign of 
It's easy to show that 
As a result, 
A4. The Proof of Corollary 1
To prove this proposition, we will show that A b converges to 1 and p * con- 
Next we will find the limits of p * when N b or N s grows to infinity. Recall 
A5. The Proof of Proposition 3
Totally differentiating N b and N s , we have
Solving for this equation system, we can derive the following:
where ∆ = (
The two first-order conditions of the platform's profit maximizing problem
Solving for this equation system, we arrive at
By the fact that
, the first-order conditions can be written as
A6. The Proof of Comparative Static Results
Firstly, we investigate the effects of the change in the exogenous parameters on the number of users. We already know that M bb < 0, M ss < 0 and M bs = M sb > 0 from A2. Furthermore, the Hessian matrix associated with π is Next, we investigate the platform's pricing policy in response to parametric changes. To do so, we differentiate (6) and (7) with respect to all parameters concerned, respectively. Then the partial derivatives can be written as the general formula:
where y = c i , t i or v for all i, j ∈ {b, s}. When the numbers of buyers and sellers are large enough, ln(1− is approximately equal to N i , i ∈ {b, s}. Substitute these into (16) to (22) and z, we have the following approximations:
We therefore have
Putting these into (25), it is straightforward to obtain the comparative static results: 
where π ij ≡ 
